

*The* PEOPLE *Are*  
DANCING  
AGAIN




*The History of the Siletz Tribe of Western Oregon*

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## TERMINATION

*"Historic Indian policy has been swept away.*

*Assimilation must be the goal."*

**F**EDERAL INDIAN POLICY ALWAYS HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY the tension between two broad and opposing ideas—separatism and assimilation. Initially, separatism dominated. Witness the original "Indian Country" beyond the Appalachians with the line steadily moved west and, later, the Coast Reservation, both assumed to be for Indians only, beyond the needs of the settlers. After the Civil War, the government moved to assimilation, epitomized by "No Indian Talk" boarding schools and allotment, which opened many reservations for settlement by non-Indians. Beginning in the 1970s, Congress adopted the self-determination policy, based on a measured separatism in which tribes are the principal, although not exclusive, governments on the reservations. In between the boarding school-allotment version of assimilation and modern self-determination—roughly from the mid-1940s through the 1960s—lay the most extreme form of assimilationist policy: termination. Congress would not just encourage assimilation but force it by eliminating the reservations and breaking up tribal communities.

Termination can be defined simply—an end of all reservations, federal obligations, and tribal sovereign rights, including those promised by treaties. Termination's specific provisions and impacts—and the ethos—cannot be explained so easily. In fact, perhaps the single most distinguishing feature of termination is that when Congress began passing termination acts in 1954—the Siletz statute was in the first wave—the new policy was a generality, not

much more than a slogan. Indian people had no realization of what it meant. The same was true for most, perhaps all, of the federal leaders and employees who worked on termination—members of Congress and Interior department officials in the Washington, D.C., and regional officers who failed to do any serious examination of history, culture, or economics. For all concerned, it was an experiment dreamed up in the dark.

Understanding of the real meaning of termination set in as the fourteen termination laws—covering 109 tribes and bands, 11,466 individuals (about 3 percent of all Indians), and 1,362,000 acres (3.2 percent of Indian land)—went into effect and took hold. Tribal land was sold off, and individual allotments, released by termination from the Indian Reorganization Act's ban against allotment transfers, once again went on the market and passed from Indian hands. Communities broke up and dispersed. Economic and social conditions worsened. In the 1960s, as the tribes that escaped termination began asserting their sovereignty and hunting, fishing and water rights, terminated tribes were left on the sidelines. And, immeasurable but all too real, members of terminated tribes felt a profound pain as termination ruptured tribal ties and slashed their very sense of personal identity. As one terminated Oregon Indian agonized, "I mean, even the [other] tribes looked at us as, 'You're not Indian any more.' And that's basically what the Termination Act said, 'They will no longer be Indians.' How do you deal with that?"



E. Morgan Pryse arrived in Portland in 1946 as the new BIA district director for Oregon, Washington, and Idaho. A veteran BIA employee, he started his career at the Klamath Reservation in 1920 and made several stops before being promoted to district director. From the beginning Pryse was enthusiastic about cutting off federal responsibilities to the Siletz. Severing relations with tribes was emerging as the basic departmental policy; the idea made sense to Pryse as a general matter and the Siletz, as an essentially landless tribe, was a logical candidate. While the tribe's termination may have been inevitable, Pryse was the one who made the case.

He had a good foundation to build on. Commissioner John Collier's promotion of tribalism and federal trust duties had made him few friends on Capitol Hill. Beginning in the early 1940s, various committees and individual members of Congress proposed shutting down Indian health and education programs, removing Indian lands from trust status, and virtually eliminating

the BIA—termination in everything but name—and called for the “emancipation” of Indians from BIA control and the removal of Indian land from trust. With pressure building, one of the clearest examples of the shift in federal policy was the testimony of acting BIA Commissioner William Zimmerman before a Senate committee in 1947. Zimmerman, a Collier loyalist required by duty to respond to the committee’s directive, identified tribes for which BIA services could be eliminated. He also specified four criteria that Congress might use in identifying tribes for termination: (1) degree of acculturation; (2) economic resources and condition of the tribe; (3) willingness of the tribe to be relieved of federal control; and (4) willingness of the state to assume jurisdiction. While Zimmerman did not intend it as such, termination advocates proceeded to use his “plan” as a blueprint.

In addition to the mood in Washington, Morgan Pryse also enjoyed favorable conditions in Oregon. Two years before being named district director, his predecessor had prepared a detailed ten-year program for the Siletz that served as a useful precedent. The 1944 document set an ultimate goal: “Decreasing government assistance during the next ten years and final termination of such help at the end of that time.” It appears that this was the first time that the word “termination” was used, at Siletz or elsewhere, to describe federal Indian policy. U.S. Senator Guy Cordon of Oregon offered assistance on withdrawal of federal services at Siletz as early as 1947 and Governor Douglas McKay, who took office in 1948, supported termination.

With gusto, Pryse set about the job of laying the foundation for Siletz termination legislation. Within a few months after arriving in Oregon, he took up the matter of closing the short-staffed Grand Ronde–Siletz agency administered out of an office at Chemawa Indian School and then shut it down in 1947, shifting the work to the Portland office. In 1948, Pryse announced a major initiative, giving notice of meetings with committees of every tribe in the district “to determine when the federal government may withdraw its supervision and turn over Indian property, etc. to the tribes.” He would later tell Congress that he “spent much of his own time on Saturdays and Sundays from 1948 to the present [1953] in meeting with various Indian groups, county and State officials in proposing withdrawal of the Indian Service over affairs of the western Oregon Indians.” Tribal consent was considered important, though not essential, to termination and the Siletz Tribal Council minutes show that he did often attend the meetings. He may, though, have spent little time in one-on-one or small group meetings. Tribal council member Dan Orton complained to Senator Cordon of “Morgan Pryse who has never been in our Indian homes at Siletz.”



There are no known photographs of E. Morgan Pryse at Siletz. Here, he is shown making an argument for termination at the Lummi Reservation in Washington, where termination legislation was never introduced. The stilted, uncomfortable atmosphere prevailed at Siletz also. *National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Alaska Region (Seattle), RG 75 BIA, Portland Area Office, Tribal Operations Branch, General Subject Files, ca. 1934–1951 (George P. LaVatta) Box 1511.*



The decisive year was 1950, which saw an alignment of interests in Washington, Portland, and Siletz. Policy hardened, and termination was just a matter of time.

In the years leading up to 1950, federal policy was a blend of John Collier's commitment to tribalism and some form of reasonably rapid assimilation. In addition to the calls issuing from members of Congress for federal withdrawal, the 1948 report of the influential Hoover Commission, chaired by the former president and charged with examining governmental efficiency in light of post-war needs, addressed Indian policy and found that "the basis for historic Indian culture has been swept away. . . . Assimilation must be the dominant goal of public policy." Yet no Indian reform legislation was introduced, much less passed.

The Interior department was of two minds. William Brophy, appointed commissioner in 1945, sympathized with Collier's views but, to appease the changing sentiments in Congress, acknowledged withdrawal as a long-term goal. He took ill early in his term, assigned many duties to Zimmerman, his top assistant, and left office in June 1947. Zimmerman—like Brophy, caught in the middle—continued as acting commissioner until the appointment in March 1949 of John Nichols, who held the post for less than a year and made no mark. The Bureau of Indian Affairs had been rudderless for half a decade.

That changed abruptly on May 5, 1950, when Dillon S. Myer, a Truman appointee, took over as commissioner. Lacking any background in Indian matters, his calling card was his service as director of the War Relocation Authority, the detention camp system for Japanese Americans during World War II. Myer was honest and known for his diligence and efficiency: he knew how to set a mission, hire the right people, and push resolutely to achieve his goals. Always the hard charger, the new commissioner had received sharp criticism on civil liberties grounds during his WRA years for his treatment of Japanese Americans—who were United States citizens. He had exacted harsh sanctions, including isolation, on perceived "troublemakers"; required loyalty oaths of all detainees; and consigned those who refused the oaths to especially overcrowded and undesirable concentration camps. Myer's work at the WRA included an analogue to termination, the step-by-step dismantling of the system after the war's end. Within months after taking office at the BIA, he announced his objective: terminate tribes "as fast as possible."

Myer cleaned house in the BIA. Holding little regard for Collier or his ideas, he forced out Zimmerman and other holdovers and replaced them with his own people, many from the WRA. Early on, he made deep changes to facilitate termination by asserting his approval power over attorney contracts to eliminate assertive tribal lawyers, adopting a "relocation" program to encourage reservation Indians to move to the cities, and placing boarding school students in non-Indian, Christian families. Myer made the most of BIA reorganization efforts in 1947 and 1949, which consolidated widely scattered offices into eleven areas, one of which was located in Portland under Pryse. With his own people in the key Washington, D.C., and area offices, the commissioner established a smooth-working engine to do his bidding. As historian Francis Paul Prucha explained:

By effectively reducing the division directors in Washington to staff officers, [Myer] concentrated administrative decision in his own hands, and by giv-



Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah (*left*) and Dillon S. Myer, BIA commissioner (1950–1953), were the principal leaders of the termination policy. Watkins: *used by permission, all rights reserved, Utah State Historical Society*. Meyer: *courtesy of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley*.

ing substantial authority to the area directors, who would play a key role in termination activities, he strengthened the move toward withdrawal. Officials below the area level lost many of their responsibilities. The changes not only tightened the machinery of the bureau, with centralized power in the hands of the commissioner, but they eliminated to a large extent residual Collier influence among the division heads and among the field superintendents.

Myer knew how to present his ideas to the public and, like other terminationists, used a language that resonated. He rejected the reservation system, which he called a “glass case policy” that treated Indians like “museum specimens,” and favored bringing Indian people into “the sunlight of independence.” They should not be “wards” of the BIA. Rather, they should have “freedom.” This language reached its high-water mark with Senator Arthur V. Watkins, the terminationist from Utah, who, flirting with a comparison of himself to Abraham Lincoln, proclaimed of his termination bills that “following in the footsteps of the Emancipation Proclamation of ninety-four years ago, I see the following words emblazoned in letters of fire above the heads of the Indians—*THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE!*”

Myer and the others had a point. Anyone who visited an Indian reservation—Siletz, Navajo, Crow, or any other—could see the problem with their own eyes, and those who didn't go to Indian country saw it through news reports and popular literature: The poverty was unspeakable, the worst of any place in the country, and alcoholism and malnutrition were rampant. With the Bureau of Indian Affairs keeping the clamps on, individual initiative had no chance. All of this in America, which after the long war was surging, giving life to individual initiative to a degree never seen before. "Freedom." That rang true.

So there was a clear problem. Everybody knew it, the general public and Indian people at Siletz and everywhere else. Termination was the only solution on the table, and its proponents had little opposition. Indian country was too poor, too disorganized, too scared to offer an alternative. A few contrary voices sounded. John Collier came forward and called termination "social genocide," and Harold Ickes, the longest-serving Interior secretary in history, who oversaw the Indian Reorganization era, charged Myer with being "Hitler and Mussolini rolled into one." But they were old news in a new America and their entreaties were dismissed as sour grapes.

As a result, questions were never asked, at least in the beginning, and the Siletz were very much part of the beginning. There is a serious breakdown here, but is termination the right answer? Do the last remnants of Indian land have to be taken away to make Indians full citizens? Is it right to break all the treaties? If the BIA is denying Indians freedom, shouldn't the BIA be changed? Could the tribes govern themselves on the reservations and find freedom that way? In all likelihood, such questions would have been brushed aside even if asked. The time was wrong, and all the momentum was with Myer and the others. Termination was the only game in town and it moved ahead with a vengeance.



In 1950, out in Oregon, Morgan Pryse was getting down to business. The area director welcomed a directive from Myer that "makes mandatory our close attention to the possibilities of this advanced thinking for Northwest Indians," referring to plans to discontinue federal supervision over tribes. In response, Pryse drafted a report entitled "Program for the Early Termination of Selected Activities and Withdrawing Federal Supervision over the Indians at Grand Ronde-Siletz and Southwestern Oregon," which was completed in

December 1950. Fitting as it did with Myer's agenda, the document put Siletz termination on the front burner.

The 1950 Program was brief—just nineteen pages of text covering three tribal groups—superficial, and wholly out of character for the seriousness of the matter. The first two elements for termination under the 1947 Zimmerman analysis were “degree of acculturation” and “economic resources and condition of the tribe,” but Pryse’s program was devoid of data or discussion of those factors. By any standard, analysis of these issues was critical. If they were not met, how could a tribe be ready for termination? Detailed socioeconomic information had traditionally been part of BIA reporting, all the way back to the annual reports in the early days of the reservation. The “Ten-Year Program, 1946–1955,” prepared in 1944 by Pryse’s immediate predecessor, for example, had examined the tribes’ economic and social situation in considerable detail and sounded a warning that cried out for discussion in Pryse’s report. After detailing the high number of Siletz jobs in defense-related industries during wartime, the Ten-Year Program was pessimistic about the future: “This picture, however, will change materially after the war and it is feared unemployment conditions, similar to those experienced during the CCC program, will return.”

Why the 1950 Program departed from the practice of thorough reporting is unknown. Pryse was a good bureaucrat, and his annual reports to Washington, D.C., show an attention to detail. He may have felt that he had to act quickly here, due to real or perceived pressure from the commissioner’s office. By then it was clear that Siletz would be one of the first tribes that the BIA would put forth to Congress under the new program. Myer wanted action.

Or perhaps the facts were inconvenient. Just a few months before, Pryse had reported to the commissioner that “there appears to be quite a number of indigent Indians of the [Grand Ronde–Siletz] district who demand assistance” in meeting their health needs. A year earlier, referring to the sharp downturn in the local timber industry, Pryse commented that “due to the gradual closing down of the mills and logging camps within the vicinity of Siletz, Oregon, some Indians were feeling the difficult times for lack of employment.” The district office gave a grave assessment of Siletz housing in the “Ten-Year Program, 1946–1955.” The homes, many dating back to early reservation days, “are old and weather-beaten, needing considerable repair or replacing.” The Ten-Year Program further reported that the situation had not changed since a 1938 study, which found that there were “more than 80 families without

houses." The report continued: "There is only one resident family engaged in private business."

Inadequate though it was, the 1950 Program had one great strength from the government's point of view. The last two pages contained a November 12, 1950, resolution by the Siletz tribe approving termination. This seemed to fulfill the third Zimmerman criterion, the standard that most fully represents the government's trust relationship to the tribe: the "willingness of the tribe to be relieved of federal control." Or did it?



The question of tribal consent was a contentious and difficult issue for every terminated tribe. Termination advocates used approval by tribes to justify termination, to show that it was both right and fair, yet every tribal consent contained powerful elements of coercion and inevitability. It was also the case that federal officials and Indian people had different perceptions of the meaning of termination. The terminationists had a crisp, clear understanding. Termination closed down an outmoded set of federal financial, social, and legal obligations and moved the country one step closer to being "One America." The tribal understanding was much more vague. The vast majority of Indian people, tribal leaders included, had no experience with major federal policy initiatives. To a person, they did know that the BIA regime had a deadening effect that diminished and demeaned them. Being "free" of that sounded good, but beyond that point the conceptions in Indian country did not equate with the words that made their way into the statute books and the realities that followed. It was not clear to them that this freedom was linked to the loss of land, treaty rights, federal services, community, and individual identity.

Each terminated tribe had its own individualized experience. In regard to consent at Siletz, Morgan Pryse was not far from the mark when he wrote in the 1950 Program that "many Siletz people have long expressed a desire to free themselves of all further supervision or (what they term) interference by the government." Pryse's parenthetical comment, however, acknowledges that the government had one objective and the tribe another, more limited one. What Siletz tribal members wanted—to be "free of interference" by the BIA—is illustrated by an incident recounted by Lionel Youst and William Seaburg in their biography *Coquelle Thompson, Athabaskan Witness*.

In 1937, Coquelle Thompson, then in his nineties and blind, and his wife, Agnes, lost nearly everything when their house burned to the ground. They

moved into one of the cottages on Government Hill, built the previous summer for "aged and indigent" Indians. Because of the tragedy, the agent sent Coquelle \$25 from his Individual Indian Money account (IIMs are government accounts that hold moneys received by tribal members from such things as an Indian's lease of his or her allotment). In addition, the agent gave the couple a purchase order for beds and bedding.

Unfortunately, the purchase order was of no use to them because, as Agnes wrote to the agent, "the Red Cross has been very effective in helping us" by providing a bed and ample bedding. Instead, she asked the agent to send her \$150 from her IIM, which had a balance of \$174.69, so they could buy what they actually needed, furniture and two stoves. The agent responded with a check for \$50. He had found, "after carefully studying your request," that national BIA regulations placed a cap of \$50 per month on withdrawals from IIMs.

Further entreaties to a new agent came out no better. The hurt and frustration is evident in this plea from Agnes, a nurse, who wrote on behalf of her husband, a person of great stature in the tribe:

Dear Sir: Please send me the amount of money that I asked for \$150. I am surprised that I am not in trust of my own money after all these years. . . . Do you know how I am living? I suppose you think I squander it away, well you may at any time investigate my record and see my character status. I am in need of this money so please send it at once.

Truly yours,  
Coquelle Thompson, Sr.  
by Mrs. A. Thompson (wife)

Frustration with BIA oversight and the humiliation of having to beg for assistance was widespread. This was coupled with a steady decline in federal services beginning in the late 1930s. By the 1950s, the Portland area office allowed only the most minimal health care for Siletz, and children could go to Chemawa and perhaps qualify for a bare-bones BIA college scholarship. Otherwise, there was little left to the federal relationship save the degrading and arbitrary control over land and individual money accounts.

Siletz tribal members had other perceptions of termination. With the high poverty rate, people wanted access to the scant resources in BIA hands. As Joe Lane, tribal chair in the 1970s, explained, among the Siletz "the word 'termination' was not used. That was a new word in our vocabulary. The term which was used was 'liquidation.' And the Indians at that time felt liquidation

meant they would probably be compensated for some of the timber that had been taken and some of the land." In this view, the four remaining tribal timber sections—containing 2,600 acres, scattered and not much used by tribal members—could be liquidated, with the sale proceeds distributed among tribal members.

Lane's explanation is consistent with years of requests from tribal leaders. In 1947, Hoxie Simmons asked the Interior secretary for assistance in obtaining "permission for the tribe to manage its own . . . affairs." Tribal chairman Elmer Logan, writing on behalf of the tribe, wrote Commissioner Myer that "our tribes want immediate liquidation." In 1951 the tribe requested that the four timber sections be sold. Just as Coquelle Thompson had to plead for the release of funds from his IIM account, so too did the tribal council in 1949 and 1950 implore the BIA to distribute \$150 per capita payments to tribal members from the tribe's trust account, which had been accumulating funds from timber sales on tribal land. The tribe's anger toward the BIA during the years leading up to the vote on whether to consent to termination was expressed in Vice Chairman Daniel Orton's 1949 letter to Senator Cordon:

You will recall that over a year ago our people sent a petition to you and others there in Washington asking that our timber sales money be paid out to us. You have our correspondence relative to the same. This however Senator Cordon is a dire emergency and something must be done and soon.

I think that you know that the Indian Bureau there in Washington has consistently opposed any payments of our timber money on the Siletz Reservation to our people in per capita payments and they persist in controlling our funds. Our boys fought and died in two wars or more against this sort of Indian Bureau dictatorship and paternalism and we are tired of it and we are capable of managing our own property and financial affairs and we feel that the Indian Bureau with its misfits and parasites should be liquidated and the sooner the better for all concerned.

There were other misunderstandings. Siletz people hoped that termination could bring down the curtain on their perceived second-class citizen status. They resented the federal laws that prevented them from purchasing alcohol at restaurants, bars, and package stores. They chafed at Oregon's law prohibiting interracial marriages and believed that termination would cure that. Maybe, as the BIA assured them, termination would bring a new era that

would end racial discrimination. Wilfred Wasson, chairman of the Coquille Tribal Council, spoke to that notion:

The Bureau of Indian Affairs officials had told us they were going to remove all the special liabilities and limitations of being Indian and thereafter we would be just like white people. This, of course, did not happen. Employers, teachers and government officials still treated us like Indians. We still felt like and thought of ourselves as Indians. The only difference was that we no longer had health services, we no longer had education benefits and we could now pay property taxes just like non-Indians.

In understanding the Siletz state of mind about termination, there is also the matter of possible BIA coercion. We know that Senator Watkins withheld claims payments for the Menominee and Klamath tribes until they agreed to termination. These payments came from court cases the tribes had won, but actual disbursement of funds depended on congressional action through the appropriations process, which normally was routinely done. In 1950 the claims were all the talk at Siletz: four separate cases involving nearly all the tribes in the confederation were in the Court of Claims or Indian Claims Commission; in the largest one, the *Alcea* case, the Court of Claims had just ruled for the Tututni, Chetco, Coquille, and Tillamook tribes in the amount of \$16 million (this is the award that the Supreme Court reduced to \$3.3 million a year later).

There is no conclusive evidence that Pryse, Myer, Watkins, or others made threats to the Siletz about withholding claims funds. Tribal members, though, were jumpy about these cases, all trudging toward completion after their long journeys through the courts. At Siletz and other reservations, there was a widespread belief that, at the very least, the BIA implicitly coerced the tribes by delaying claims awards. Much later, during the Siletz restoration effort in 1976, BIA Commissioner Morris Thompson ordered a thorough review of the coercion issue in response to a request from the Senate Indian Affairs subcommittee. He found no evidence in the agency files and noted that Pryse had unequivocally testified to Congress that there was no such pressure. Although it is probable that coercion will never be finally proven, Commissioner Thompson pointedly noted one tantalizing piece of circumstantial evidence. As the Siletz termination bill went through Congress, the appropriation bill for the *Alcea* judgment followed right behind it in both the Senate and the House. The appropriations measure became final just seventeen days after the termination statute was signed into law.



Archie Ben was a central Siletz figure for decades. He served regularly on the Siletz Tribal Council and was stalwart in preserving tribal traditions. Admired for his commitment to the old ways, he instructed young people in Nee Dosh, arranged for public dances in area locales, and helped put on dances in peoples' homes. *Courtesy of Ed Ben.*



Whether or not the BIA used claims payments as a prod or a club, Morgan Pryse was unrelenting. As of early 1950, his case for Siletz termination lacked a proper constitution and governing body; there was no acceptable legal structure or voice to provide the tribal consent that Pryse wanted. In 1935, the BIA had pushed for an IRA constitution to activate Collier's idealistic vision and the tribe voted it down. In 1940, the agency urged a constitution and governing body to regularize administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps and other federal grant programs for Siletz, and the tribe balked. In 1949, the BIA—now under Pryse—came back again with a different motive, to pave the way for termination, and once again the Siletz had rejected the proposal.

Pryse would not give in. In September 1950, with his urgency now joined by Dillon Myer's, he came back to the tribe once more. This time the constitution and by-laws were adopted at an open tribal meeting. Although the BIA made much of tribal involvement, claiming that members of the tribal business committee "were especially busy in drafting the constitution and assisting all along the line," this was a government-issue constitution: Ever



The buildup to termination was a stressful time at Siletz, but people still found time for celebrations. Here, in 1948, tribal members do a “good time” dance—an informal, social version of Nee Dosh—to welcome back Arthur Bensell Jr. and his wife, Margaret, who were returning to the reservation to operate the general store in Siletz. Archie Ben is singing and drumming on the far right, joined (*from right*) by Griffin John, Mary Washington, Aggie Williams, and Helen “Nellie” Orton. *Siletz Tribal Collection*.

since the IRA, tribal constitutions were mostly boilerplate charters drafted by the BIA with few differences from tribe to tribe. No matter. Now, with this constitution, there was a seemingly respectable legal framework for obtaining agreement to termination.

Pryse came back for the tribal consent just two months later. It was a confusing time for tribal members. So much was swirling around Siletz in 1950—so many highfalutin’ words, so many misconceptions, so little common understanding between the tribe and the federal officials, so much pressure. Dr. Hiroto Zakoji, the long-time BIA anthropologist in the Portland area office in the 1950s, who witnessed termination first-hand, was satisfied that there was “very little understanding of what termination was all about” at Siletz. “I don’t think there was more than a handful of people who knew what

Termination was," recalled Hardy Simmons, who came back home after serving in World War II. "Most people only knew about Termination through rumors. . . . The big words the BIA used to talk about termination made it hard for people to understand, especially the older people." Archie Ben, a tribal council member since the 1930s, was of the same mind. "The vote came very quickly and I do not think that the members of the Council really understood all of the things that Termination stood for."

A sense of inevitability dulled the Siletz response to the program that Pryse brought to them. The congressionally established American Indian Policy Review Commission, which held hearings and conducted interviews at Siletz and Grand Ronde in the 1970s, found that there was "an attitude held by many tribal members that termination was inevitable and would happen no matter what the Indians decided." The new generation of Siletz tribal leaders saw the final action as preordained. As Joe Lane said, "We had people in the amounts of 25 or 30 or less than that attending meetings of the tribes. They thought, 'Well, we are going to be terminated anyway.'" To Dolly Fisher, "the Bureau pushed hard. It had to happen." As a young woman, Jo Anne Miller attended many of the termination meetings. "I just figured it was going to happen and that was it."

Pryse sought formal tribal consent at a general council meeting on November 12, 1950. There is no record of how many of the 786 tribal members attended the meeting, but few tribal meetings in those days exceeded 40 members. It is a byword in Indian culture that people who are against a proposal will stay home or attend a meeting and refuse to vote. The resolution in support of the principle of withdrawal (the word "termination" was not used), doubtless drafted by Pryse's office, stated—without indicating the numbers of votes for or against—that "we have advanced in education, customs, and knowledge . . . [and] we feel that we are able, willing, and should assume the duties and responsibilities of full American citizenship." The voters resolved "that the Federal Government withdraw all restrictions and services now existing . . . at the earliest practicable moment." Pryse reported to Commissioner Myer that it had been "an enthusiastic meeting" although he did not mention the size of the vote.



One further procedural matter lay ahead. The tribe had approved withdrawal in principle but also needed to sign off on the actual bill itself. Interior depart-

ment attorneys in Washington drew up the language and on August 10, 1951, the commissioner's office telegraphed the text of the bill out to Oregon for approval by the Siletz and Grand Ronde tribes. Now the bill referred to "termination" rather than "withdrawal," although the substance was the same—the final and complete separation that the federal officials had been espousing all along. But the gap between the conceptions held by Interior officials and the Siletz leaders, much less the general membership, had not been closed. When Pryse wrote Myer on September 11 there seemed to be a considerable rush, which led to an unseemly recommendation: "I believe the Commissioner would be justified in starting immediate action on this proposed legislative bill without awaiting formal resolutions from the Indians, since it has been discussed with many of them and not a single member has objections." When these discussions took place is not clear. Pryse made one visit to the Coast in August, but it "coincid[ed] with the day of per capita payments, a funeral," and jobs in the hop fields and the woods. As a result, although "copies of the bill have been distributed among tribal members," Pryse found that "it was not possible to get affirmative action" on the proposal. The next tribal meeting at Siletz was on September 30, but Pryse could not attend. Action was tabled for a week by a vote of 23 to 0.

Approval of the draft bill came before a special general council meeting on Sunday, October 7. Just thirty-four tribal members attended. Pryse, who read a letter from Commissioner Myer, led the discussion. This time there was a vote count. When the matter came up, thirteen approved and no opposition was reported. Less than 3 percent of the adult population of the Siletz tribe had approved the termination bill.

A month later, at the regularly scheduled tribal meeting for November, tribal members brought forth an important matter. Some fifty-seven acres of land, small in size but heartland, were in federal ownership. By resolution, the tribe requested that the agency area, the day school, the cemetery, the canal, and the mill sites—Government Hill and places where people had held meetings, enjoyed social events, run a cannery, attended school, worked, danced Nee Dosh, and been buried—be transferred to a tribal corporation to be established under state law. This was the only change to the legislation that the tribe requested, but it was not added to the bill.

Grand Ronde-Siletz termination bills—among the first to be brought forward for any tribe and actually out in front of Congress's announcement of the termination policy a year later—were introduced in April 1952 and went quickly to subcommittee hearings in both Houses on May 21, 1952. Associ-

ate Commissioner Rex Lee presented testimony for the administration before the Senate subcommittee, and Commissioner Myer spoke on the House side at the perfunctory proceedings. No Siletz people attended. The bills stalled and never got out of committee, perhaps because relatively few congressional working days remained in that presidential-election year. Besides, while the Interior department strongly endorsed the bills, there was no committed base of support in Congress for immediate action, especially in the Democratic Party, which controlled both Houses.



Indian policy changed dramatically after the election of 1952, with the rapid-fire adoption and implementation of termination. It was not due to the new president. Truman, a Democrat, had appointed the termination-minded Myer, and the Republican Eisenhower decided not to keep him on because he had become a lightning rod for criticism. In all, however, administration policy remained the same. Former Oregon Governor Douglas McKay, who favored termination, moved to the capital as secretary of the Interior and, along with Commissioner Glenn Emmons, continued the policies and personnel in place under Myer. There is no sign that McKay gave any particular attention to terminating the western Oregon tribes.

The difference came in Congress, where Republicans took over both chambers. Even so, it was not exactly a matter of party. For years, the small group of legislators, mostly westerners, who paid attention to Indian affairs had agreed in principle that something big needed to be done. Termination, the only proposal put forward, had no congressional detractors but few people in Congress had strong feelings about this new strategy. What broke through the legislative passivity was the rise of the incoming chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, a veteran lawmaker who fervently believed in termination and knew how to pull the right levers of Congress so that a handful of true believers could control the legislative process.

Arthur V. Watkins, a self-made man who grew up in rural Utah and became a farmer and lawyer, earned election to the Senate in 1946 on a clean-government platform. He gained stature for his stands on principles; in the mid-1950s, for example, he was the first Republican to condemn the excesses of Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy for his Red-baiting crusade. A crusader himself, the white-maned Watkins—who came to Indian Affairs with little or no contact with Natives—believed that if he could pull himself up by his

bootstraps, so could Indians. The senator, a tough, aggressive chairman who politely led favorable witnesses in the desired direction and often badgered and insulted dissenting witnesses, made that point many times over. To Governor Maytubby of the Chickasaw Nation, he asked, "Why can [Indians] not do the same as the white man does. . . ? I wanted to be a lawyer. The Government did not come around and offer to pay my tuition and pay my board. . . . I had to get out and work long, hard hours for it." To Gordon Keshena of the Menominee Tribe, who doubted the readiness of many of his tribespeople for termination, Watkins asserted: "All you have to do is to agree now to grow up—that you are no longer children." On another occasion, he charged that Indians "want all the benefits of the things we have, highways, schools, hospitals, everything that civilization furnishes, but they don't want to help pay their share of it."

For Watkins, the only solution was termination—and soon. While one can doubt his tactics and his wisdom, he seemed convinced of the rectitude of termination. In all probability the Siletz bill would have passed soon anyway, but the determination and leadership of Watkins and a few others made it a certainty.

As a cornerstone, the terminationists wanted a strong, clear statement of policy so that bills terminating individual tribes would be identified as carrying out the will of Congress. Congressman E. Y. Berry, a business-oriented Republican from South Dakota, introduced House Concurrent Resolution 108 to declare termination as official congressional policy. Henry Jackson, a Democrat from Washington who had favored termination-style proposals in the House before his 1952 election to the Senate, carried the resolution in the Senate. With Berry and Watkins chairing the two Indian Affairs subcommittees, HCR 108 passed both Houses smoothly and went into effect on August 1, 1953. Now the United States Congress had announced its future course of action with respect to Indian tribes, people, and land:

Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship; and

Whereas the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States should assume their full responsibilities as American citizens: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),* That it is declared to be the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and the individual members thereof [in certain tribes] . . . should be freed from Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians.

The resolution listed several tribes, including the Klamath, although for reasons unknown it did not refer to the western Oregon tribes, who were in fact at the head of the list. HCR 108 directed the BIA to prepare, by the end of the year, recommendations to terminate other tribes. To avoid alarming congressional colleagues, the resolution never spelled out the real effects of the new policy: treaty abrogation, sell-off of Indian lands, and the end of federal programs for impoverished Indian people.

With the overarching policy announced, Congress could now begin the business of terminating tribes, one by one. For expediency, the hard-driving Watkins chose to move individual termination bills through Congress by means of joint Senate-House hearings; one hearing would thus suffice for both Houses. The Senator also sought to push through a large number of termination bills, and 1954 became one of the most active years in the long history of Indian lawmaking. To begin the parade of joint hearings, he selected three groups: the Southern Paiute Tribe of Utah, the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas, and the western Oregon tribes. The hearings would be held on three consecutive days beginning on February 15, 1954.

The subcommittee hearings for the Utah and Texas tribes make depressing reading. In both cases, tribal members were dirt poor and had little formal education. No tribal members testified. Non-Indians, however, had plans to exploit the tribes' land. The Southern Paiutes had received an inquiry from a mining company that wanted to lease tribal land "without going through the usual procedure." The Alabama-Coushatta had 4,000 acres of "good forest land." In time, both termination bills passed. These tribes obviously needed help, but was termination the right approach?

Next up was the bill for the Siletz, Grand Ronde, and, to be certain that no western Oregon Indians were overlooked, a long list of small tribes and bands in southwestern Oregon (mostly families formerly associated with the Siletz Reservation.) The joint Senate-House subcommittee took up the bill at a hearing on February 17. Morgan Pryse had done some rewriting of his 1950 Program, but his presentation—the principal supporting document for termination—remained woefully weak. As in 1950, the agency produced no

data whatsoever on the central issue of economic readiness for termination. Instead, his assessment, which portrayed Siletz people as prosperous and indistinguishable from the white population, was subjective, glib, and wildly overstated. Pryse's report on the subject of "social and economic progress" amounted to this:

Almost every employable male person of Indian blood is gainfully employed. Some are in business for themselves, in logging, fishing, and other pursuits. Others are employed in the lumber mills and logging camps, and some are employed in offices and banks. More women of Indian blood are accepting employment of all types. There are a number, both men and women, who teach in the public schools. Practically all of these Indians have been integrated into the social structures of their respective communities.

Under the section on "Justification for Federal Withdrawal," Pryse offered this assessment:

*1. Ability to handle own affairs*

The younger generations are mixed bloods and in most cases have the appearance of white people; they are literate, have practically all of the mannerisms of the average white person, are practically all gainfully employed either in their own businesses or by others, and are capable of attending to their own affairs to the same extent as other citizens.

The director went even further in his responses to Senator Watkins's leading questions:

SENATOR WATKINS. Based on what I have heard here today, it appears that these Indians have made great progress.

MR. PRYSE. They have, indeed.

SENATOR WATKINS. They have made progress in being able to take care of themselves. Do you have any theory, or any observations to make, as to why they seem to be out in front?

MR. PRYSE. Well, sir, I would say because they have been so well integrated among the non-Indians or the whites down there, that they generally have attended public schools and attended the same churches, lodges, and have had to get out and make a living for themselves all up and down

the coast among the white communities, and the Indians have more or less become a part of the community in which they live.

SENATOR WATKINS. For the most part they are able to take care of themselves, and they provide for their own welfare, and they are not on State or county welfare rolls?

MR. PRYSE. To no greater degree than their white neighbors; about the same number as their neighbors. They are well integrated.

SENATOR WATKINS. They have not had any great amount of property given to them?

MR. PRYSE. No.

SENATOR WATKINS. That is, not through the Federal Government?

MR. PRYSE. They have had to take care of themselves, and you will find many of them range from fifth-grade education clear on up through college graduates. They are very fine, and many are well-educated people, and many have responsible positions.

SENATOR WATKINS. I wonder if there were any special reasons there why these Indian groups are so far out in advance of many other Indian tribes in the United States.

MR. PRYSE. I think it is because they have lived in these scattered communities all up and down the coast among the non-Indians, and they worked with them and for them; and they have gone to the same schools, churches, social events, and so forth; and they have more or less become citizens of the community.

SENATOR WATKINS. They have the same type of homes, I suppose?

MR. PRYSE. Yes; you often cannot tell an Indian home from another. They drive nice cars and dress nicely, and you often cannot distinguish them from non-Indians.

The report also was notable for a significant omission on the issue of tribal consent to termination. The document includes the November 12, 1950, resolution in which the tribe approved withdrawal in principle, but the resolution of a year later, on October 7, 1951, was more relevant: rather than addressing the concept of withdrawal, it approved specific language in a draft bill. Unlike the 1950 resolution, which did not include the vote count, the 1951 tribal resolution included the vote of 13 to 0. Could the later resolution have been left out of the report to Congress because, by documenting the excruciatingly low Siletz participation, it would have sent up a red flag that something was terribly wrong with the consent process?

To their credit, both Pryse and Rex Lee raised the issue, not included in the bill before the subcommittee, of transferring the fifty-seven acres of federal lands on Government Hill and elsewhere in Siletz to a tribal corporation after termination. This was the amendment—the only one—that the tribe requested at the tribal council meeting on the draft bill in October 1951. The government men raised the tribal concerns perfectly, saying that “we think it would be less disrupting . . . to give this [land] to the community,” for it “is being used 100 percent by the tribe [as opposed to the government] now as a community center, and the building there and the cemetery and there are about 10 cottages . . . which are occupied by old Indians that would have no other place to go.” Neither Senator Watkins nor Representative Berry showed any support for the idea. Instead, after termination became final the Interior department conveyed these lands, which held so much meaning for Siletz people, to the City of Siletz.

No tribal people testified at the hearing.



The Siletz tribe stood in a position different from most of the other terminated tribes and it came from the legacy of the nineteenth century. Notably, the Siletz did not lose a magnificent reservation in the way that tribes such as the Klamath and Menominee did; those were landed tribes and the impact of a potential breakup of their reservations was obvious to anyone. The Siletz was once a landed tribe and suffered a similar loss, but not at termination. In that sense, they were not as badly affected as many of the other terminated tribes.

It also may be true that the Siletz were somewhat more assimilated than most reservation Indians in that they had more day-to-day contact with non-Indians. That, too, came as a result of the break-up of the reservation as white people moved in and made their homes on the compelling Oregon Coast. But the Siletz were not fully assimilated, not nearly as assimilated as Morgan Pryse claimed them to be. This was a time when many Indian people kept their identity under wraps. Jim Metcalf, a former Coquille tribal chairman, explained that “a lot of Indians didn’t want to admit they were Indians. It was a lot easier to get a job if you weren’t. Indians were the last hired and first fired.” But the Siletz were still Indians, people who heard and respected the old calls.

Economic life was nothing like the picture painted by supporters of termi-

nation. It was not true, as Pryse reported to the Congress, that "almost every employable [Siletz male] is gainfully employed." The Siletz people were poor, high in unemployment, and low in formal education. We know that Indian unemployment nationally in the 1950s was about ten times higher than the rate in the country at large and that precious few Native people had gone to college. Things were somewhat better for the Siletz because of the logging jobs, but not by much. In the mid-1970s, when reliable statistics were finally available, Siletz unemployment was estimated at 44 percent and average income was one-half, or less, than that of the general population in Lincoln County. Nearly half of Siletz young people did not finish high school. True, termination made things worse, but circumstances were dire in the early 1950s and the Bureau of Indian Affairs was wrong to paper that over in its presentations to Congress.

Although there was probably more understanding in the BIA than anywhere else of the wreckage that termination would bring, virtually no one in the Bureau stood up against termination at Siletz or elsewhere. Dissent was not brooked in the agency. The sense of momentum was overwhelming from the day Dillon Myer entered office, and lockstep was expected and enforced. Nevertheless, one person did stand up. That was E. Morgan Pryse, who had the courage to tell Senator Watkins and Congressman Berry at a joint Senate-House subcommittee hearing of how termination would inevitably cause the Klamath to lose their land.

One might wonder why Pryse was so brave at the Klamath hearings and so lacking in bravery at Siletz. The reasons may trace to his personal background at Klamath, the losses of the nineteenth century at Siletz, and the complexity of a radical policy that no one fully comprehended. Pryse had begun his career at Klamath and likely was moved by the prospect of the Klamath losing their grand expanse of ponderosa pine and river country in central Oregon, fully sixty miles north to south, twenty miles east to west. He could see what a wonderland the Klamath had to lose. The Siletz, who once had a comparable reservation, had nothing like that in the 1950s. The best use of the remaining tribal timber lands was to liquidate those isolated parcels, as tribal leaders had urged.

As for what the Siletz actually had to lose, it turns out that all manner of losses were discussed barely or not at all during the termination process. Giving Pryse the benefit of the doubt, perhaps he did not see them or he badly underestimated them. After termination, when the state cracked down on tribal hunting and fishing, the reduction in subsistence use affected the diets

and health of most Siletz families. The elimination of education benefits, which included partial college scholarships, and limited health benefits, minimal though they were, mattered to the many people below the poverty line. While the tribe held only the timber sections, there were seventy-six family allotments totaling 5,390 acres. That is a lot of Indian land, and most of the allotments were prime parcels, on the rivers or the Coast. After termination most of that land was lost in distress, sold for badly needed cash or auctioned off in tax sales. With those home places mostly gone, people moved out—a diaspora—and the sense of community crumbled. Perhaps Pryse did not foresee all of that. Virtually nobody did.

Such can be the case when the nation's legislature imposes an untried idea with too much force, in too much of a rush, and with too little thought.

On August 13, 1954, President Eisenhower signed the Siletz Termination Act into law. Two years later, Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton approved the final tribal roll so that \$792.50 could be paid to each tribal member from the sale of the tribal timber lands. The United States had terminated its special relationship with the Siletz Tribe—ridding itself of all the treaties, all the promises, all the obligations—once and for all.

- old age group, are now enjoying earnings never before received”).
- P. 276 *Indians served at a rate three times higher.* Mary B. Davis, ed., *Native America in the Twentieth Century: An Encyclopedia*, p. 341 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996). Approximately 10 percent of living American Indians are veterans. *Ibid.* See also Jere' Bishop Franco, *Crossing the Pond: The Native American Effort in World War II* (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 1999); Kenneth William Townsend, *World War II and the American Indian* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000); Alison R. Bernstein, *American Indians and World War II* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
- P. 276 “*the Indian’s fame is world wide.*” Townsend, *World War II and the American Indian*, p. 134.
- P. 276 “*best damn soldier in the Army.*” *Ibid.*
- P. 276 *more than one-third of adult males served.* In 1944, the tribal population was 518, of which 257 were male. BIA Ten-Year Program, p. 2. Estimating from the BIA’s age data, it appears that at least 115 males were over- or under-age (42 over-age and 73 school-age), leaving about 142 eligible males. *Ibid.* Thus the conclusion that more than one-third of the adult males served.
- P. 276 *Houses were dilapidated.* *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- P. 277 “*a basic purpose of Congress.*” Arthur V. Watkins, “Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions Over Indian Property and Person,” vol. 311 *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, p. 50 (May 1957).

### 13 Termination

- P. 279 *Fourteen termination laws.* For a listing of the termination laws and summary of the individuals and lands affected, see Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R. Biggs, “The Evolution of the Termination Policy,” vol. 5 *American Indian Law Review*, p. 151 (1977).
- P. 279 “*You’re not Indian any more.*” Doug Foster, “Landless Tribes: Termination of the Klamath Reservation,” vol. 1, no. 2 *Oregon Heritage*, p. 7 (1994) (quoting Lynn Schonchin of the Klamath Tribe).
- P. 280 *termination in everything but name.* See Harold E. Fey and D’Arcy McNickle, *Indians and Other Americans: Two Ways of Life Meet*, pp. 148–49 (New York: Harper & Row, 1970) (members of a special Senate committee subsequently claimed that they had never authorized the contents of the termination-style report, but the document was never recalled); Kenneth R. Philp, *Termination Revisited: American Indians on the Trail to Self-Determination, 1933–1953*, pp. 1–2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999). The committee’s report can be found at Senate Report No. 310 “Survey of Conditions Among the Indians of the United States: Analysis of the Statement of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Justification of Appropriations for 1944, and the Liquidation of the Indian Bureau,” 78th Congress, 1st Session (June 11, 1943) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943). On calls for “emancipation,” see Wilkinson and Biggs, “Evolution of the Termination Policy,” pp. 146–47.
- P. 280 *Zimmerman testimony.* Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Civil Service, “S. Res. 41: A Resolution to Investigate Certain Matters Relating to Officers and Employees of the Federal Government,” 80th Congress, 1st Session, pt. 3, p. 546 (Feb. 8, 1947) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947). See also Fey and

- McNickle, *Indians and Other Americans*, pp. 161–62; Francis Paul Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*, pp. 1026–27 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984); Donald L. Fixico, *Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1960*, p. 33 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986); S. Lyman Tyler, *A History of Indian Policy*, pp. 163–64 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973); Philp, *Termination Revisited*, p. 75. The Grand Ronde Tribe was included on Zimmerman's list. Perhaps out of inadvertence—the list was put together hurriedly—the Siletz Tribe was not. In 1944, John Collier had been required by a congressional committee to produce a similar list, which included the Siletz. Philp, *Termination Revisited*, p. 72.
- P. 280 *Termination advocates used Zimmerman's "plan."* Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father*, p. 1027; Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, p. 33.
- P. 280 *"Decreasing government assistance."* Bureau of Indian Affairs, Salem Agency, "Ten-Year Program, 1946–1955, Siletz, Oregon," p. 23 (March 1944), RG 75, Grand Ronde–Siletz Indian Agency Holdings 77, Box 161, 10 Year Program 1944 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region [hereinafter BIA Ten-Year Program].
- P. 280 *Senator Guy Cordon and Governor Douglas McKay.* On Cordon, see W. Gardner, acting secretary of Interior letter to G. Cordon, U.S. senator for Oregon (May 29, 1947), at Archival Collection of the Siletz Tribe Cultural Department [hereinafter Siletz Archival Collection]; G. Cordon, letter to H. Simmons, tribal representative (June 3, 1947), at Siletz Archival Collection. On McKay, see D. McKay, governor, letter to E. M. Pryse, Department of Interior regional director (Aug. 21, 1951), in Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, "S. 3005 and S. 3004," 82d Congress, 2d Session, vol. 2, pp. 87–88 (May 21, 1952) (Washington, D.C.: Ward & Paul, 1952), at Siletz Archival Collection.
- P. 280 *Closing the Grand Ronde–Siletz agency.* See E. M. Pryse memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Nov. 29, 1946), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1948 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region (proposing elimination of the agency); Senate Report No. 1325 to Accompany S. 2746, "Termination of Federal Supervision over Property of Certain Indians in Western Oregon," 83d Congress, 2d Session, p. 11 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954) [hereinafter 1954 Senate Termination Report].
- P. 280 *Major 1948 initiative.* E. M. Pryse memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Sept. 1, 1948), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1948 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region.
- P. 280 *"spent much of his own time."* E. M. Pryse letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Dec. 7, 1953) in Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, "On S. 2746 and H.R. 7317: Termination of Federal Supervision over Certain Tribes of Indians," 83d Congress, 2d Session, pt. 3 (Western Oregon), p. 139 (Feb. 17, 1954) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954) [hereinafter Western Oregon Joint Hearings].
- P. 280 *"Morgan Pryse who has never been in our Indian homes."* D. Orton, vice chairman, Siletz Tribal Council, letter to G. Cordon (Feb. 11, 1949), at Siletz Archival Collection (informing Senator Cordon that "our people are in bad shape and are in dire need of

- assistance" and urging that the senator not be misled by the "deceit and deception" of Pryse).
- P. 281 "the basis for historic Indian culture." Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government Special Task Force Report, "Social Security and Education—Indian Affairs: A Report to Congress," pp. 54–55 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948) (quoted in Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father*, p. 1029).
- P. 282 *The Interior department was of two minds.* See generally Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father*, pp. 1017, 1023–30. Prucha describes this period as "vacillating" between self-determination and termination (ibid., p. 1017), and characterizes the department's approach as "a moderate form of terminationism" (ibid., p. 1027).
- P. 282 *Dillon S. Myer.* See generally Richard Drinnon, *Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
- P. 282 *WRA years.* See ibid., pp. 76–116.
- P. 282 *terminate tribes "as fast as possible."* Dean Frank T. Wilson, "Interview with Dillon S. Meyer, commissioner of Indian Affairs," vol. 7, no. 2 *The Journal of Religious Thought*, p. 99 (Spring/Summer 1950).
- P. 282 *Myer cleaned house in the BIA.* On the purge of Collier adherents, see Kenneth R. Philp, *John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920–1954*, p. 225 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977); Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, pp. 65–66.
- P. 282 *deep changes to facilitate termination.* The activist Myer Administration is discussed in Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father*, pp. 1030–36; Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, pp. 63–77; Philp, *Termination Revisited*, pp. 87–124; Philp, *John Collier's Crusade*, p. 225; Wilkinson and Biggs, "Evolution of The Termination Policy," pp. 147–48. Myer justified the Bureau's controlling regulations over the hiring of tribal attorneys as a way to prevent disreputable lawyers from exploiting vulnerable tribes. See, e.g., Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, pp. 67–68. For a detailed discussion on tribes' right to employ legal counsel, see Philp, *Termination Revisited*, pp. 108–24. Myer's relocation program was meant to "break the cycle of poverty, paternalism, and despair on Indian reservations" by moving employable Indians to urban areas where "they would become self-reliant and civic-minded people." According to Philp, the purpose of Myer's "boarding-home placement program for Indian children" was for Indian students "to better appreciate Christian civilization." Philp, *Termination Revisited*, pp. 97–99.
- P. 282 "By effectively reducing the division directors." Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father*, p. 1038.
- P. 283 "museum specimens." Philp, *Termination Revisited*, p. 90 (quoting Myer).
- P. 283 "the sunlight of independence." Ibid., p. 94 (quoting Myer).
- P. 283 "THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE!" Arthur V. Watkins, "Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions over Indian Property and Person," vol. 311 *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, p. 55 (1957).
- P. 284 "social genocide" Philp, *John Collier's Crusade*, p. 227 (quoting Collier's letter to President Eisenhower).
- P. 284 "Hitler and Mussolini rolled into one." Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father*, p. 1030.
- P. 284 "makes mandatory our close attention." Bureau of Indian Affairs, Portland Area Office, "Program for the Early Termination of Selected Activities and Withdrawing Federal Supervision over the Indians at Grand Ronde–Siletz and Southwestern Oregon," p. 6 (Dec. 1950), RG 75, Grand Ronde–Siletz Indian Agency Holdings 77,

- Box 161, 10 Year Program 1944 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region [hereinafter 1950 Program].
- P. 284 "Program for the Early Termination." See generally *ibid.* Pryse's enthusiasm was evident: "If the Bureau of Indian Affairs should initiate new plans and encourage certain Indian tribes to travel along this new road to the future, it seems feasible that Indians under the Grand Ronde-Siletz Administration should be included in the program." *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- P. 285 *The "Ten-Year Program."* See generally BIA Ten-Year Program.
- P. 285 "This picture, however, will change materially." *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- P. 285 "quite a number of indigent Indians." E. M. Pryse memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 6 (Sept. 1, 1950), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1950 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region.
- P. 285 "gradual closing down of the mills and logging camps." E. M. Pryse, area director, memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Dec. 1, 1949), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1948-1949 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region.
- P. 285 "old and weather-beaten." BIA Ten-Year Program, p. 12.
- P. 285 "more than 80 families without houses." *Ibid.*
- P. 286 "only one resident family." *Ibid.*, p. 10
- P. 286 *Siletz tribal resolution.* 1950 Program, pp. 20-21. According to the resolution—which declared that the Siletz were "willing and should assume the duties and responsibilities of full American citizenship" and that "Federal supervision has ceased to be necessary"—"there were no dissenting votes cast."
- P. 286 "many Siletz people have long expressed." *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- P. 286 *Agnes and Coquelle Thompson incident.* Lionel Youst and William R. Seaburg, *Coquelle Thompson, Athabaskan Witness*, pp. 238-50 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002). For Agnes's initial letter to the agent concerning the IIM account and his response, see *ibid.*, p. 239.
- P. 287 *Agnes Thompson letter.* *Ibid.*, pp. 240-41.
- P. 287 *Steady decline in federal services.* The BIA discontinued some programs in the late 1930s and early 1940s. See chapter 12, p. 274 and accompanying notes. By the late 1940s, national BIA appropriations had been reduced and the Portland area office felt the effects. See, e.g., Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, pp. 34-35; E. M. Pryse, area director, memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 4 (May 2, 1947), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1948-1949 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region (abolishing the medical program at Grand Ronde-Siletz "owing to lack of funds"). In 1952, Commissioner Myer testified that, except for financial matters involving land, "we [a]re providing very little of the other social services to [the Grand Ronde-Siletz] Indians at this stage of the game." Hearing Before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, "H.R. 7489," 82d Congress, 2d Session (May 21, 1952) (Washington, D.C.: Columbia Reporting Co., 1952), at Siletz Archival Collection.
- P. 287 *area office allowed only the most minimal health care.* In 1947, Pryse reported that the medical program for Siletz and Grand Ronde had been abolished, but, apparently, in some years a doctor was available a few hours a week in Siletz for minor ailments

- and a hospital in Tacoma, a day's drive, would take some serious cases. E. M. Pryse memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 4 (May 2, 1947), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1948–1949 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region. In 1950, Pryse reported that the Siletz-Tacoma hospital arrangement was in force. 1950 Program, p. 16.
- P. 287 *"the word 'termination' was not used."* Statement of Joseph Lane, former chairman, Siletz Tribal Council, in *Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs*, "Siletz Restoration Act: On S. 2801," 94th Congress, 2d Session, p. 43 (March 30–31, 1976) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976) [hereinafter Siletz Restoration Hearings].
- P. 288 *"permission for the tribe."* W. Gardner letter to G. Cordon (May 29, 1947), at Siletz Archival Collection (describing Simmons's letter).
- P. 288 *"our tribes want immediate liquidation."* E. Logan, tribal chairman, letter to D. Myer, commissioner of Indian Affairs (Aug. 29, 1950), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 56, Box 1508, Grand Ronde–Siletz General 1947–1951 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region. This is a rare instance in which the tribe's use of the term "liquidation" referred to removing allotments, as well as the tribe's timber sections, from trust status.
- P. 288 *tribe requested that the four timber sections be sold.* Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Special Meeting Minutes, Siletz, Oregon, Oct. 7, 1951, at Siletz Archival Collection; E. M. Pryse memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 9 (Nov. 1, 1951), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1951 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region.
- P. 288 *Per capita payments from the tribe's trust account.* See, e.g., H. R. Cloud, regional representative, letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (June 7, 1949), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 56, Box 1508, Grand Ronde–Siletz General 1947–1951 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region (referring to attached May 29, 1949 Tribal Business Committee resolution requesting per capita payments); E.M. Pryse, letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Aug. 7, 1950), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 56, Box 1508, Grand Ronde–Siletz General 1947–1951 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region (enclosing a June 25, 1950 tribal council resolution requesting a \$150 per capita payment to each of the 685 eligible members).
- P. 288 *"You will recall."* D. Orton letter to G. Cordon (Feb. 11, 1949), at Siletz Archival Collection.
- P. 288 *Oregon's law prohibiting interracial marriages.* Termination did not address that matter, although the Oregon legislature repealed the statute in 1951. See chapter 11, p. 250 and accompanying note.
- P. 289 *"The Bureau of Indian Affairs officials had told us."* Roberta Ulrich, *A Lot of Funerals: The Failed Termination Experiment, 1953–2006*, p. 6 (chap. 4) (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010) (quoting Wilfred Wasson).
- P. 289 *Senator Watkins withheld claims payments.* See, e.g., Vine Deloria Jr., *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto*, pp. 69, 71–73 (New York: Avon Books, 1969) (on the Klamath and Menominee, respectively). See also American Indian Policy Review Commission, Final Report, "Task Force Ten: Terminated and Nonfederally Recog-

- nized Indians," p. 42 (Oct. 1976) [hereinafter Task Force Ten]; Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father*, p. 1050; Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, p. 96.
- P. 289 *The Alcea claims case*. See chapter 12, pp. 263–65 and accompanying notes.
- P. 289 *Widespread belief of BIA coercion*. See, e.g., M. Thompson, commissioner of Indian Affairs, letter to J. Abourezk, U.S. senator for South Dakota (April 6, 1976), in Siletz Restoration Hearings, p. 325.
- P. 289 *Review of the coercion issue*. *Ibid.*, pp. 323–26.
- P. 289 *Pryse testified there was no such pressure*. *Ibid.*, p. 325. The Pryse testimony can be found in the Western Oregon Joint Hearings, p. 187. In response to the inquiry whether the termination legislation "had to be passed before [the Indians] could get their distribution of their funds," Pryse answered "oh, no," and pointed out that "the tribes have never withdrawn their resolutions" consenting to termination.
- P. 289 *tantalizing piece of circumstantial evidence*. M. Thompson letter to J. Abourezk (April 6, 1976), in Siletz Restoration Hearings, p. 325 (the Termination Act was dated Aug. 13, 1954; the Alcea Judgment Per Capita Act was dated Aug. 30, 1954).
- P. 290 *1935 push for an IRA constitution*. See chapter 12, pp. 272–75 and accompanying notes.
- P. 290 *In 1940, the agency urged a constitution*. See chapter 12, pp. 273–75 and accompanying notes.
- P. 290 *BIA motive to pave the way for termination*. H. R. Cloud letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Feb. 25, 1949), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 07, Box 37, Siletz Tribe—Constitution and By-Laws 1948–1950 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region. The vote against the 1949 proposed constitution was 77 to 4. *Ibid.*
- P. 290 *Adoption of a constitution in September 1950*. Pryse reported the adoption in a report to Commissioner Myer, calling the vote "unanimous." E. M. Pryse memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 7 (Oct. 1, 1950), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1950 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region. See also E. M. Pryse letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Oct. 18, 1950), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 7, Box 37, Siletz Tribe—Constitution and By-Laws 1948–1950 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region. Although there do not seem to be existing tribal council minutes for the September 10, 1950, tribal council meeting, a later council resolution refers to the adoption of the constitution on that date. See Tribal Council, Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, Resolution of Oct. 7, 1951, at Siletz Archival Collection.
- P. 290 *"were especially busy in drafting"* H. R. Cloud letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Feb. 25, 1949), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 7, Box 37, Siletz Tribe—Constitution and By-Laws 1948–1950 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region. Later in the same letter, Roe Cloud noted that Elwood Towner and Dan Orton, whom Roe Cloud asserted were instrumental in drafting the constitution, strongly opposed adoption in a public meeting on the day of the election. *Ibid.*
- P. 291 *boilerplate charters drafted by the BIA*. Although the 1950 constitution was not technically an IRA constitution because the tribe had voted down an IRA constitution in 1935, the document was of the same style and substance as the IRA versions. For a collection of the IRA constitutions, see *Indian Reorganization Act Era Constitutions*

- and *Charters*, University of Oklahoma Law Center, at <http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA.html> (accessed Feb. 6, 2009). See also, e.g., Robert L. Bennett et al., "Implementing the IRA," in Kenneth R. Philp, ed., *Indian Self-Rule: First-Hand Accounts of Indian-White Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan*, p. 83 (Salt Lake City, UT: Howe Brothers, 1986) ("most of the IRA constitutions were quite similar").
- P. 291 "very little understanding of what termination was all about." Hiroto Zakoji, telephone interview with Carrie Covington, research assistant, July 27, 2007.
- P. 291 "I don't think there was more than a handful." Statement of Hardy Simmons (March 14, 1976), in *Siletz Restoration Hearings*, p. 140.
- P. 292 "The vote came very quickly." Statement of Archie Ben (March 14, 1976), in *Siletz Restoration Hearings*, p. 141.
- P. 292 "termination was inevitable." Task Force Ten, p. 46.
- P. 292 "people in the amounts of 25 or 30." Statement of Joseph Lane, in *Siletz Restoration Hearings*, p. 43.
- P. 292 "the Bureau pushed hard." Dolly Fisher, interview with author, Siletz, Oregon, May 23, 2005.
- P. 292 "I just figured it was going to happen." Jo Anne Miller, interview with author, Siletz, Oregon, May 24, 2005.
- P. 292 many of the 786 tribal members. The "final" tribal roles, approved on August 7, 1954, counted 786 tribal members. *Western Oregon Joint Hearings*, p. 141.
- P. 292 Few tribal meetings exceeded 40 members. See, e.g. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Special Meeting Minutes, Siletz, Oregon, June 24, 1951, at *Siletz Archival Collection* (29 members present); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Special Meeting Minutes, Siletz, Oregon, Oct. 7, 1951, at *Siletz Archival Collection* (34 members present); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Regular Meeting Minutes, Siletz, Oregon, Nov. 3, 1951, at *Siletz Archival Collection* (15 members present).
- P. 292 "able, willing, and should assume the duties and responsibilities." Tribal Council, Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, Resolution of Nov. 12, 1950, in *Western Oregon Joint Hearings*, pp. 159–60.
- P. 292 "an enthusiastic meeting." E. M. Pryse memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, p. 5 (Dec. 1, 1951), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1950 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region.
- P. 293 Bill telegraphed on August 10, 1951. H. Lee, acting commissioner of Indian Affairs, telegram of draft bill to E. M. Pryse (Aug. 10, 1951), at *Siletz Archival Collection*.
- P. 293 "I believe the Commissioner would be justified." E. M. Pryse letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Sept. 11, 1951), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 12, Grand Ronde–Siletz 1952–1954 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region.
- P. 293 "it was not possible to get affirmative action." E. M. Pryse memorandum to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Sept. 1, 1951), RG 75, Portland Area Office Holdings 01, Box 1, Monthly Narrative Reports for 1951 Folder, at National Archives Records Administration, Seattle, Pacific Northwest Region.
- P. 293 Action was tabled for a week. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Regular Meeting Minutes, Siletz, Oregon, Sept. 30, 1951, at *Siletz Archival Collection*.
- P. 293 October 7 special general council meeting. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Special Meeting Minutes, Siletz, Oregon, Oct. 7, 1951, at *Siletz Archival Collection*.

- P. 293 *Resolution to transfer lands to tribal corporation.* Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Regular Meeting Minutes, Siletz, Oregon, Nov. 3, 1951, at Siletz Archival Collection.
- P. 293 *Request not added to the bill.* Neither the 1952 nor 1954 bill, as originally introduced, included the provision requested by the tribe. As finally enacted, the Siletz Termination Act did address the issue but in a different fashion: the secretary was authorized to transfer these lands to "any tribe or any member or group of members" or to "a public or nonprofit body." Pub. L. No. 588, ch. 733, §8, Aug. 13, 1954, 88 Stat. 724, 726 (1954). The land eventually went to the City of Siletz. See p. 293 and accompanying note.
- P. 293 *Grand Ronde-Siletz termination bills.* See Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, "S. 3005 and S. 3004," 82d Congress, 2d Session, vol. 2, pp. 87-88 (May 21, 1952) (Washington, D.C.: Ward & Paul, 1952), at Siletz Archival Collection; Hearing Before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, "H.R. 7489," 82d Congress, 2d Session (May 21, 1952) (Washington, D.C.: Columbia Reporting Co., 1952), at Siletz Archival Collection.
- P. 294 *Eisenhower decided not to keep Myer.* See, e.g., Charles Wilkinson, *Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations*, p. 65 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2005).
- P. 294 *Arthur V. Watkins.* See, e.g., *ibid.* pp. 66-69; Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, pp. 93-96; Prucha, vol. 2, *The Great Father*, pp. 1015-16.
- P. 295 *A tough, aggressive chairman.* On Watkins's tactics and the political tone of Congress during the termination years, see the in-depth study by Gary Orfield, *Professor of Education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education*. See generally Gary Orfield, "A Study of the Termination Policy," pp. 14-15 (Denver, CO: National Congress of American Indians, 1966). Orfield's study also can be found as a congressional reprint in Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, "The Education of American Indians," 91st Congress, 1st Session, vol. 4, pp. 673-816 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970). See also Wilkinson and Biggs, "Evolution of the Termination Policy," pp. 155-56.
- P. 295 *"Why can [Indians] not do the same?"* Fixico, *Termination and Relocation*, pp. 92-93 (quoting Watkins).
- P. 295 *"agree now to grow up."* *Ibid.*, p. 96 (quoting Watkins).
- P. 295 *Indians "want all the benefits."* Orfield, "A Study of the Termination Policy," p. 690 (quoting Watkins).
- P. 295 *"Whereas it is the policy of Congress."* For the full text of the Resolution, see H. Con. Res. 108, Aug. 1, 1953, 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (not codified). See also House Report No. 841 to Accompany House Concurrent Resolution 108, "Expressing the Sense of Congress that Certain Tribes of Indians Should be Freed from Federal Supervision," 83d Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1953); Senate Report No. 794 to Accompany House Concurrent Resolution 108, "Expressing the Sense of Congress that Certain Tribes of Indians Should be Freed from Federal Supervision," 83d Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1953).
- P. 296 *Subcommittee hearings for the Utah and Texas tribes.* See Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, "On S. 2760 and H.R. 7674: Termination of Federal Supervision over Certain Tribes of Indians," 83d Congress, 2d Session, pt. 1 (Utah) (Feb. 15, 1954) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954) [hereinafter Southern Paiute Joint Hearings]; Joint Hearings

- Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, "On S. 2744, H.R. 6282, and H.R. 6547: Termination of Federal Supervision over Certain Tribes of Indians," 83d Congress, 2d Session, pt. 2 (Texas) (Feb. 16, 1954) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954) [hereinafter *Alabama-Coushatta Joint Hearings*].
- P. 296 *The Southern Paiutes had received an inquiry.* Southern Paiute Joint Hearings, p. 60. The "usual procedure" referred to was that leases of Indian lands go through a competitive bidding procedure. *Ibid.*
- P. 296 *The Alabama-Coushatta had 4,000 acres.* Alabama-Coushatta Joint Hearings, pp. 102–3.
- P. 296 *Bill for Siletz termination.* See Western Oregon Joint Hearings.
- P. 297 *"Almost every employable male person."* *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- P. 297 *Ability to handle own affairs.* *Ibid.*, p. 150.
- P. 297 *"these Indians have made great progress."* *Ibid.*, pp. 185–86.
- P. 298 *November 12, 1950 resolution.* See *ibid.*, pp. 159–60. Regarding the October 7, 1951 resolution, see Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians Special Meeting Minutes, Siletz, Oregon, Oct. 7, 1951, at Siletz Archival Collection.
- P. 299 *"we think it would be less disrupting."* Western Oregon Joint Hearings, p. 189.
- P. 299 *"is being used 100 percent by the tribe."* *Ibid.*, p. 190.
- P. 299 *The lands were conveyed to the City of Siletz.* Regarding the bill's treatment of the tribe's request, see above, p. 293 and accompanying notes. The Interior department ultimately transferred the lands to the City of Siletz. See Bureau of Indian Affairs, Siletz Agency, "Report on Status of Government Reserves, Siletz, Oregon" (May 31, 1979), at Siletz Archival Collection.
- P. 299 *"a lot of Indians didn't want to admit they were Indians."* Ulrich, *A Lot of Funerals*, p. 8 (chap. 4) (quoting Jim Metcalf).
- P. 300 *Indian unemployment and college education in the 1950s.* See Wilkinson, *Blood Struggle*, pp. 22–25 and accompanying notes.
- P. 300 *Siletz unemployment was estimated at 44 percent.* On Siletz unemployment, see Siletz Restoration Hearings, p. 201; on Siletz income, see *ibid.*, pp. 204–5.
- P. 300 *Nearly half of Siletz young people did not finish high school.* *Ibid.*, p. 203.
- P. 300 *Pryse had the courage to tell Senator Watkins.* When asked what he thought would happen to Klamath land transferred out of trust and into the hands of individual Indians, Pryse responded, "I am afraid it would pass out of Indian ownership, a great portion of it, in a matter of a few years." Pryse's rationale for this prediction was that the Indians "haven't had the experience of making a living and providing for taxes and also withstanding the pressure of people to buy their property." Wilkinson, *Blood Struggle*, pp. 78–79.
- P. 301 *seventy-six family allotments totaling 5,390 acres.* See Western Oregon Joint Hearings, p. 144.
- P. 301 *\$792.50 could be paid to each tribal member.* The \$792.50 was paid out in two distributions: \$250 in 1954 and \$542.50 in 1956. Siletz Restoration Hearings, p. 340.

## 14 Restoration

- P. 305 *The socioeconomic statistics were dismal.* The statistics in the text are drawn from the only comprehensive study of Siletz socioeconomic status in the early and mid-1970s.